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Currency misalignments and exchange rate regimes
in Latin American countries: a trade-off issue*
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1 Introduction
The role of the nominal exchange rate in Latin American economies has evolved
markedly over the last half-century. In the first part of the period, although it
served as the main anchor of nominal stability, it was also the primary source of
economic and financial crises. In recent decades, its capacity to absorb changes
in external conditions has grown in a context of more open and stable economies.
Concurrently, over the whole period, the dynamics of the real effective exchange
rates in the region were characterized by large swings, strong volatility, and per-
sistent misalignments. Such sustained deviations of the real exchange rate from its
equilibrium level are likely to produce severe macroeconomic disequilibria, whose
resorption requires successful stabilization policies and exchange rate management.
Within this context, the choice of exchange rate regime (ERR) appears to be a key
issue. Indeed, various macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation, unemployment,
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financial and balance of payment crises, as well as episodes of rapid growth, are
mainly influenced by exchange rate policies and regimes (see Rodrik, 2008; Frenkel
and Rapetti, 2010; and Martin Guzman and Stiglitz, 2018).
This paper aims at addressing this critical question by investigating the impact of
ERR on real currency misalignments, i.e., on the deviations of the real exchange
rate from its equilibrium value. Since currency imbalances have a strong influence
on the macroeconomic performance of countries, the level of the real exchange rate
matters greatly. In particular, Latin American countries have experienced several
overvaluation episodes that have had detrimental effects on economic growth. The
choice of ERR plays a key role in that regard. Argentina and its fixed ERR provide
a typical example in the 1990s, as the massive Argentina peso overvaluation plunged
the country into a great depression. However, the movement towards more flexibility
in the ERR has also strongly affected countries’ macroeconomic results, as illustrated
by the Chilean case during the 1970s. Hence, the choice of ERR is far from being
straightforward.
From a theoretical viewpoint, two main explanations have been put forward regard-
ing the link between ERR and currency misalignments. On the one hand, Fried-
man (1953) states that flexible exchange rates encourage price convergence across
countries, even where the prices of goods are rigid. In that context, changes in the
nominal exchange rate substitute for nominal price adjustments. On the other hand,
under fixed ERR, transaction costs are reduced and cross-border trade is enhanced
in the goods market. Price convergence is thus fostered as the transparency of price
differentials that could be arbitraged away is increased (Rose, Lockwood, and Quah,
2000). Turning to the empirical literature, here too the results are not clear-cut re-
garding the impact of ERR on misalignments. Dubas (2009) considers a panel of 102
countries and shows that for developing economies, intermediate regimes (regimes
falling somewhere between a pure float and a hard peg) are more effective in re-
ducing the size of misalignments. Conversely, Nouira and Sekkat (2015) find that
intermediate ERR tend to generate larger and more volatile misalignments. For
their part, Coudert and Couharde (2009) find that misalignments are higher in the
case of fixed ERR, and Holtemoller and Mallick (2013) show that the higher the
flexibility of the regime, the lower the misalignment and, thus, the probability of
an impending crisis. These diverging conclusions are partly due to differences in
the selected samples, and call for more “targeted” studies dealing with countries
characterized by specific experiences like those of Latin America. Furthermore, al-
though these aforementioned studies investigate the effect of ERR on the size of
misalignments, they are silent on its impact on their persistence.
This paper falls into this strand of the literature, to which we contribute in several
ways. First, we consider a sample of 17 Latin American countries over quite a long
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time-span, allowing us to account for various exhaustive exchange rate arrangements
within the sample period. Given the continuous changes in exchange rate policy
linked to macroeconomic imbalances in this region, our sample is especially relevant
for empirical purposes. Second, we rely on a robust approach to derive currency
misalignments by considering (i) the main relevant exchange rate determinants,
and (ii) cross-country dependencies through the use of effective (i.e., multilateral)
exchange rates and appropriate panel estimation methods.1 Third, whereas the
existing literature mainly relies on one or two of the usual ERR classifications, we
consider four different classifications, including one that we define as consensual.
Fourth, in addition to investigating the effect of ERR on the size of misalignments,
we also rigorously analyze its impact on their persistence. In doing so, our paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to consider explicitly the two dimensions
of misalignments, size and persistence, when assessing the impact of the EER on
deviations of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium value. Finally, turning to
methodological issues, we pay particular attention to cross-sectional dependencies
across countries and provide several robustness checks.
Our main findings show that although fixed ERR perform well in limiting the size of
misalignments, the disequilibria are more persistent. On the contrary, allowing for
more flexibility reduces persistence, but increases the size of misalignments. Overall,
we show that Latin American countries face a crucial trade-off when they have to
choose their ERR.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology and
describes the data. Section 3 displays the estimation results, and related comments.
Section 4 provides several robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology and data
2.1 Estimating exchange rate misalignments
Commonly defined as the deviations of real effective exchange rates from their equi-
librium values, currency misalignments can be derived from the following equation:
misi,t = reeri,t − r̂eeri,t, (1)
1In this regard, we go further than previous studies on currency misalignments in Latin Amer-
ican countries, which typically focused on (i) one specific country or a quite limited sample of
economies (see, e.g., Buchs, 2005, and Paiva, 2006, on Brazil; Giannellis and Koukouritakis, 2013,
on a panel of four countries), and/or (ii) a limited number of exchange rate determinants (Alberola,
2003; Fernando Broner, 2005; Chi-Wei Su and Chang, 2011).
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where i and t refer to the cross-section unit (country) and the time unit (year), re-
spectively. mis denotes the currency misalignment, reer stands for the real effective
exchange rate (in logarithmic terms), and r̂eer is its corresponding equilibrium level.
An increase (decrease resp.) in reer denotes an appreciation (depreciation resp.) of
the real exchange rate, a positive (negative resp.) value of misalignment refers to
a currency overvaluation (undervaluation resp.). To assess this equilibrium value,
various approaches exist in the literature, among which the most popular are (i) the
purchasing power parity (PPP) approach which is relevant only in the very long-
run (see Rogoff, 1996), (ii) the medium-run, fundamental equilibrium exchange-rate
approach (FEER) of Williamson (1983), and (iii) in -between, the behavioral equilib-
rium exchange-rate approach (BEER) introduced by Faruqee (1995) and MacDonald
and Clark (1998).2 As shown by Bénassy-Quéré, Béreau, and Mignon (2010), these
various approaches can be seen as complementary rather than opposite in the sense
that each of them corresponds to a particular horizon. In this paper, we rely on the
BEER methodology that has the double advantage of (i) not requiring assumptions
regarding the internal and external balances, and (ii) accounting for stock effects
through the net foreign asset position.
According to the BEER approach, the real effective exchange rate of country i
at period t is linked to a set of economic fundamentals through a cointegrating
relationship defined as follows:
reeri,t = f(nfai,t, bsi,t, toti,t, openi,t, govi,t), (2)
with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T . Equation (2) includes the following explanatory
variables:
 The net foreign asset position as a percentage of GDP, nfait. This variable is
expected to have a positive impact on the real effective exchange rate, both
series being related through the intertemporal budget constraint which links
external assets, real exchange rate and trade balance together (see, e.g., Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002). A country running a current account deficit (sur-
plus resp.) is expected to experience a depreciated (appreciated resp.) real
exchange rate to restore external equilibrium.
 A measure of relative (tradable versus non-tradable sectors) productivity as a
proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, bsit, expressed as a logarithm. We re-
tain here the relative GDP per capita to proxy productivity, which is available
2See Driver and Westaway (2005) for a survey. For a discussion on the validity of PPP for
developing countries, including Latin American economies, see Edwards and Savastano (1999) and
Nouira and Sekkat (2015) among others.
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for a wide range of countries. As for the preceding variable, the relationship
between reerit and bsit is expected to be positive as the Balassa-Samuelson
effect reflects the convergence process of a country resulting in an appreciation
of its real exchange rate through greater productivity growth in the domestic
tradable sector.
 Terms of trade, totit, expressed as a logarithm. The impact of changes in
terms of trade on the real effective exchange rate is not clear-cut at first sight
in the sense that two effects are at play, a substitution and an income effect,
acting in opposite directions (De Gregorio and Wolf, 1994). According to the
substitution effect, an improvement in the terms of trade (i.e., an increase in
the price of exports relative to imports) leads domestic agents to shift their
demand towards imported goods. The impact on the exchange rate is negative
as the currency has to depreciate to restore the external equilibrium. Regard-
ing the income effect, an improvement in the current account position tends
to increase demand for non-tradable goods. As a consequence, prices in the
non-tradable sector augment as well as the general price level, appreciating
the real exchange rate.
 Trade openness, openit, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Again, the influence
of trade openness on the exchange rate is quite ambiguous due to the existence
of substitution and income effects, operating in opposite directions (see, e.g.,
Edwards, 1989).
 Government spending, denoted as govit and expressed as a percentage of GDP.
According to Froot and Rogoff (1995), this variable positively impacts the real
exchange rate through the direct effect it exerts on the prices of non-tradable
goods. This explanation has been called into question by Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohé, and Uribe (2012), arguing that a rise in government spending stimu-
lates private consumption, in turn, depreciating the real exchange rate.
2.2 Explaining exchange rate misalignments
Once the series of currency misalignments have been calculated, a key issue is to
assess whether the ERR impacts their size and persistence. To this end, we rely on
two models of different but complementary natures, each of them having a specific
purpose.
Theoretically, the stability of the international monetary system requires national
monetary balances (absence of misalignments) or weak controllable monetary dis-
tortions (small misalignments). Similarly, large currency misalignments are also
7
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undesirable at the national level since they often hide significant economic distor-
tions. Therefore, we assess the impact of the ERR on the size of misalignments
through the following static model:





i,t + εi,t, (3)
where |mis| represents the absolute value of the misalignment, ERR denotes the
exchange rate regime, and X is a vector of k control variables regrouping the level
of financial development, the quality of institutions, changes in the terms of trade
(in absolute terms), and a dummy variable to account for crises. Equation (3) is
similar to that in Dubas (2009), but with additional controls (quality of institutions
and terms of trade variations).3 To the extent that countries with strong political
and financial institutions experience fewer political or monetary crises, or manage
them more effectively, they are likely to exhibit smaller exchange rate misalignments.
Thus, we expect negative coefficients associated with the quality of institutions and
financial development variables. In addition, currency misalignments are potentially
larger in countries facing more pronounced terms of trade shocks (Amano and van
Norden, 1995; Mendoza, 1995; Devereux and Connolly, 1996). For Latin American
countries, Zeev, Pappa, and Vicondoa (2017) show that variations in the terms of
trade are an important and indisputable determinant of economic fluctuations. We
expect a positive coefficient associated with terms of trade changes (in absolute
terms). Finally, we include a crisis indicator among the control variables to take
into account the years of banking crises which are periods characterized by larger
currency misalignments.4 Since ERR are classified from the most fixed to the most
flexible, an estimated positive value for α1 would mean that the more flexible the
EER, the larger the currency misalignments.
Besides their size, the persistence of misalignments is also a major concern in emerg-
ing and developing countries. Indeed, long-lasting misalignments may reflect per-
sistent economic distortions requiring structural reforms and, sometimes, significant
adjustment costs. To examine whether the ERR influences the persistence of mis-
alignments, we consider the following dynamic model:





i,t + µi,t. (4)
3In the same vein, see also Gnimassoun (2015) for current account imbalances.
4Recall that the classifications of Shambaugh (2004) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019)
are based on the volatility of the exchange rate. We therefore eschew the use of a currency crises
dummy as a control variable because, within the present context, an exchange rate crisis indicator
is strongly correlated with discrete changes in the ERR.
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The dependent variable now refers to the misalignment, and its lagged value is
included among the explanatory variables to measure the degree of persistence. The
interaction between mis and ERR allows us to examine whether the ERR impacts
the persistence of misalignments. The control variables are the same as before, with
the terms of trade now being expressed in level due to the nature of the dependent
variable.
Equation (4) has often been used to test the relevance of Friedman (1953)’s argu-
ment that the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate allows for a more effective
adjustment of external imbalances (see, among others, Chinn and Wei, 2013; Mar-
tin, 2016; Ghosh, Qureshi, and Tsangarides, 2018). To our knowledge, only Caputo
(2015) attempts to assess the effect of ERR on the persistence of misalignments.
However, the related empirical treatment may be questioned since the dependent
variable considered in this study is the change in the real effective exchange rate
rather than the misalignments themselves. In Equation (4), the coefficient of the
interaction term (β3) deserves particular attention. Given the ERR classification,
a positive sign for β3 would indicate that the flexibility of the ERR increases the
persistence of misalignments. Conversely, a negative sign would mean that flexible
ERR are more effective in ensuring a quick adjustment of currency misalignments.
Although several studies confirm Friedman’s argument, the consensus is far from
being definitive. For example, Berka, Devereux, and Engel (2012) show that real
exchange rate movements within the Eurozone are at least as compatible with effi-
cient adjustment as the behavior of real exchange rates for floating countries outside
the euro area.
2.3 Exchange rate regime classifications
As is standard in the international macroeconomics literature, we rely on the de facto
ERR classification when investigating how the ERR affects the size and persistence
of currency misalignments. De jure classifications are based on the declared status of
countries. However, it is now well accepted that a de facto measure is more reliable
than a de jure one since, in practice, countries may have incentives to deviate from
their officially declared intention. In this paper, we consider two of the best known
and most widely used classifications, i.e., those of Shambaugh (2004) (henceforth
SHA) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019) (henceforth IRR).5
Shambaugh (2004) bases his classification exclusively on the degree of exchange rate
stability: the regime is considered as a peg if the exchange rate remains within ± 2
percent bands against the reference currency; otherwise the regime is treated as non-
5For the sake of robustness, other classifications will be considered further in the paper.
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peg. This methodology is highly transparent in its construction and delivers a clear-
cut and dichotomous classification: the ERR of a given country-year observation
is labeled as either peg (for which the dummy variable takes the value of zero) or
non-peg (the index is one).6 In addition, this two-way classification of Shambaugh
(2004) has good coverage for 16 out of the 17 countries contained in our sample
(Ecuador is the exception) over the 1970-2014 period.
Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019) built their classification by also relying on the
variability of exchange rates. However, their method is enriched by considering:
(i) data on consumer price indices’ movements to identify high inflation periods,
(ii) countries’ regime announcements (the de jure status) of which are not always
consistent with the de facto approach, and (iii) the existence of dual exchange rate
arrangements and/or parallel markets whenever they exist. In our context, consid-
ering exchange rate data coming from parallel exchange rate markets when catego-
rizing regimes is particularly relevant, as such markets accounted for a large part of
exchange rate developments in Latin America during the debt crisis of the 1980s.
The IRR classification includes 14 categories in which a regime may fall (from more
to less fixity). To improve identification, we collapse this large number of categories
into a three-way classification with the value 1 for the fixed regime (from “no legal
tender” to “de facto peg”), 2 for the intermediate regime (from “pre-announced
crawling peg” to “moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2%”), and 3
for the floating regime (“managed floating” to ”freely falling”). Besides, the IRR
measure covers all countries in our sample over our reference period 1970-2016.
Figure 1 presents the share of fixed ERR for a group of 16 Latin American countries
over the last four and a half decades.7 On the left (right resp.) panel, we plot
the share of fixed regimes according to the SHA (IRR resp.) classification for the
full sample of Latin American countries, together with South American countries
and Central American countries separately.8 As shown, fixed exchange rates are
more prevalent among Central American countries than in South America, and this
picture is similar across decades and different classifications. We acknowledge this
6In Shambaugh (2004), the original ranking is peg=1 and non-peg=0. Throughout the paper,
the two categories are reversed (i.e., peg=0 and non-peg=1) such that the SHA index is ordered
in a monotonic way from more to less fixity. This choice is made so that the ordering of the SHA
classification is consistent with that of the IRR database, see below.
7For the sake of comparability, we restrict our attention to a group of countries (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay) and a period of time (1970-
2014) that are comparable across the two classifications. This means we omitted Ecuador and
observations for the years 2015 and 2016 for all countries when considering the IRR classification.
8Fixed ERR concern regimes with a value of 0 in the SHA classification, and 1 in the IRR
classification.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin American Countries
(SHA classification on the left panel and IRR classification on the right panel).
























Note: The group of 16 Latin American countries comprises 8 South American countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) and 8 Central
American countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago). Period: 1970-2014.
issue, and address it in the robustness section (see Section 4.2). In addition, for
the whole sample, the percentage of fixed ERR has declined over time from 69% in
the 1970s to 35% in the 2010 decade according to the SHA classification (the cor-
responding numbers for the IRR classification are 45% and 21% respectively). This
pattern remains valid for both groups of countries. The declining share of fixed ERR
over time on the Latin American continent may reflect continuous adjustments in
exchange rate policy—as illustrated by the increasing adoption of inflation targeting
strategy—to deal with macroeconomic imbalances.
2.4 Data
We consider a wide panel of 17 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.9
The baseline period runs from 1970 to 2016, and data are annual.
Let us first describe the data used to estimate Equation (2). The real effective
exchange rate for country i at time t, REERi,t, is constructed as the geometric
9Note that El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are excluded from our sample due to
either data availability issues or to the fact that they have known only one ERR over the whole
period (such as El Salvador for instance, whose currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar over the
period under study).
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where Pi,t and Pj,t are domestic and foreign consumer price indexes, respectively, and
Eij,t is the nominal exchange rate (in units of domestic currency). ωj,t is the trade
weight of partner j in total trade of the home country i. Prices and nominal exchange
rates series are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
Trade weights are constructed using countries’ export and import data from the
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics database.
The variable REERi,t is expressed as an index (100 = 2000) and then converted into
logarithms such that reeri,t = ln(REERi,t). According to our definition, an increase
in reeri,t corresponds to a real appreciation. The variable nfai,t is constructed as
the ratio of the net foreign assets position to GDP, both expressed in U.S. dollars
(source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), and updates thereto). Due to the lack of
data on sectoral productivity, GDP per capita relative to trading partners is used









where yi,t and yj,t are domestic and foreign GDP per capita, respectively (source:
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database).10 Partner countries’
weights (ωj,t) are the same as those used in the construction of REERi,t, see Equa-
tion (5). The variable BSi,t is expressed as an index (100 = 2000) and then converted
into logarithms such that bsi,t = ln(BSi,t). The terms of trade, totit, are defined
as the ratio of the country’s export price index to its import price index (source:
CEPAL). Terms of trade are in logarithms, and expressed as an index (100 = 2000).
Openness (openi,t) is the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, all these variables
being in U.S. dollars (source: WDI). For government spending, gi,t, we take the
share of government consumption in GDP extracted from WDI.
Turning to the variables involved in misalignments’ regressions, we consider the
following controls: (i) an indicator of financial development constructed as the ratio
of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to nominal
GDP (source: World Bank, Global Financial Development (GFD) database); (ii) a
10This measure of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is commonly used in the international macroe-
conomics literature, see Gnimassoun and Mignon (2015, 2016) for example. Recently, Couharde,
Delatte, Grekou, Mignon, and Morvillier (2020) present and discuss the implications of alternative
measures of the Balassa-Samuelson effect suggested in the literature.
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banking crisis dummy which takes the value of 1 in the event of a banking crisis and
0 otherwise (source: GFD); (iii) a measure of quality of institutions which consists
in a score coding the authority characteristics of states, ranging from +10 (strongly




In this section, we present the results prior to the estimation of exchange rate mis-
alignments. Since the BEER approach relies on a cointegrating relationship, panel
unit root and cointegration tests are required. Due to economic and financial glob-
alization, the effects of neighborliness, the impacts of imitation, as well as common
shocks that affect the countries, we have to account for cross-sectional dependence
when implementing the tests. To avoid any bias related to the omission of potential
inter-country dependencies, we perform the test of weak cross-sectional dependence
developed by Pesaran (2015) on each variable included in Equation (2) as well as
on the residuals of the relation that binds them. The results presented in Table A-2
(Appendix A) reject the null hypothesis and thus confirm the existence of strong
inter-country dependence.11
To account for this property, we use the CADF test developed by Pesaran (2007)
to test the unit root null hypothesis in a heterogeneous panel in the presence of
cross-sectional dependence. As shown in Table A-3, the unit root null hypothesis
cannot be rejected for all variables, except for the terms of trade (tot) which are
thus excluded from the cointegrating relationship.12
Turning to cointegration, we rely on Westerlund (2007) to test the null hypothesis of
no cointegration based on the estimation of a panel error correction model. Roughly
speaking, four tests are proposed by Westerlund, two of which (Pτ and Pα) assume
homogeneity of the cointegrating vector (error correction term), the two others (Gτ
11Given the long time dimension of our panel and as a robustness check, we also perform the
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and implemented by Baum
(2001) to test for cross-sectional independence. We obtain results that are consistent with those
of Pesaran (2015)’s test, strongly rejecting the hypothesis of absence of inter-country dependency.
12Note that due to the fairly long time dimension of our panel, we also perform the unit root
tests with structural breaks of Llúıs Carrion-i Silvestre, Del Barrio-Castro, and López-Bazo (2005).
We obtain similar results (available upon request from the authors), illustrating the robustness of
our findings.
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and Gα) allowing for heterogeneity. As shown in Table A-4, the null hypothesis of no
cointegration is rejected when we allow for heterogeneity of the cointegrating vector.
Given that homogeneity of the cointegration vector under the alternative hypothesis
is quite unlikely in our panel, we therefore conclude in favor of a cointegrating
relationship between the real effective exchange rate and its fundamentals in Latin
American countries.
The last step of the BEER approach is to estimate the long-term relationship. To
this end, we rely on the Dynamic OLS approach (DOLS) proposed by Mark and Sul
(2003). In particular, we use a complete specification that allows us to control for
cross-sectional dependence:





δi,s∆xi,t−s + υi,t, (7)
where ϑi captures individual heterogeneity, λit takes into account heterogeneous
trends, and θt controls for common temporal effects (cross-sectional dependence).
The fundamentals (x) included in the cointegrating relationship are relative produc-
tivity, public expenditure, net foreign assets, and trade openness. Individual lags
(−pi) and individual leads (pi) of changes in the explanatory variables are intro-
duced to correct possible serial correlation biases. The estimation results with p = 1
are given by:









where robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are given in brackets (the
full results for p = 1 and p = 2 are reported in Table A-5).13 The results are
consistent with expectations. Indeed, an improvement in net foreign assets, public
expenditures, and relative productivity leads to an appreciation of the real exchange
rate, while increased trade openness is associated with a real depreciation of the cur-
rency. Although there is theoretical ambiguity regarding the sign of the coefficient
associated with trade openness, several empirical studies point to a negative rela-
tionship (see, e.g., Dubas, 2009; Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Soto, 2012). Finally,
we compute the value of the equilibrium real exchange rates (r̂eeri,t) from these
estimation results by considering the long-term components of the exchange rate
fundamentals.14
13Consistent with the cointegration test, we introduce one lag and one lead in the relationship for
all countries. As shown, the estimated coefficients do not change significantly when these numbers
are both increased to two.
14Following Schrø̈der (2013) and Comunale (2017), we extract the trend components of the
variables using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter of conventional value
14
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3.2 Size of currency misalignments and ERR
Table 1 reports the estimated effect of the ERR on the size of currency misalignments
(Equation (3)), the regressions being performed with and without time fixed effects.
Given the nature of the dependent variable (absolute value of misalignments), we
do not introduce country fixed effects in the regressions since this is equivalent to
removing the individual averages of the raw variables. Indeed, such a transformation
is not relevant from an economic viewpoint in an analysis like ours, whose purpose
is to explain the size (distance to zero) of currency misalignments.15 Columns (1)
to (8) show the results of the overall impact of the ERR, distinguishing the classifi-
cation of SHA from that of IRR. The last four columns (9)-(12) report the specific
impact of the ERR (fixed, intermediate, flexible) based on the IRR classification.
In these specifications, each ERR is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the
specified regime and 0 otherwise. For reasons of multicollinearity, only intermediate
and flexible regimes are included in the regressions, the fixed regime acting as the
benchmark.
Regarding the overall effect of the ERR, the results indicate that greater flexibility
is significantly associated with an increase in the size of currency misalignments re-
gardless of the classification, with or without control variables. When time dummies
and control variables are included in the regressions (columns (4) and (8)), the es-
timated ERR coefficient is highly significant whatever the specification, amounting
to 0.054 for the SHA classification and 0.076 for the IRR classification. The central
result here is that regimes in which the exchange rate is actively pegged produce
lower misalignments in absolute terms than do floating regimes, with a difference
of around 6 percent. The findings are confirmed by those on the specific effect of
the ERR. Indeed, taking the fixed regime as a benchmark in the regression, the
results show that countries with a flexible ERR experience significantly higher ex-
change rate misalignments.16 For the sake of completeness, we have estimated two
auxiliary regressions to assess whether the monetary and/or budgetary disciplines
λ = 100. Note that, for the sake of completeness and as a robustness check, we also considered
the actual values of the exchange rate fundamentals when computing equilibrium exchange rate
values. The results (available upon request from the authors) were identical to those reported in
the paper.
15Formally, allowing for country fixed effects in Equation (3) implicitly defines the dependent
variable as |misi,t| − (1/T )
∑T
t=1 |misi,t|. By construction, such a within transformation allows
the left-hand side variable of Equation (3) to take either positive or negative values, which is in
contradiction with our goal to assess the effect of the EER on the magnitude of misalignments.
16The descriptive statistics reported in Table A-1 in the Appendix A are consistent with these
results. The mean and variance of the misalignments (in absolute value terms) are much greater
under flexible ERR than under fixed and intermediate regimes, regardless of the classification.
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matter in explaining why fixed ERR are associated with smaller misalignments.17
In Table A-6, the dependent variable is the inflation rate, whereas it is the fiscal
balance in Table A-7. As shown, fixed ERR are characterized by greater monetary
discipline as flexible ERR lead to significantly higher inflation rates. Similarly, fixed
ERR outperform flexible regimes in terms of budgetary discipline. Overall, fixed
ERR tend to reduce inflation and deficits, a feature that could explain why they
perform better in limiting the size of misalignments.
However, we do not observe significant differences in the magnitude of misalign-
ments between countries under intermediate ERR and those with fixed exchange
rates. Our results diverge from those of Dubas (2009), who finds that for developing
countries, the intermediate ERR is more effective in limiting the size of currency
misalignments.18 They also differ from those of Gnimassoun (2015), according to
which flexible ERR perform well in reducing the magnitude of external imbalances
in sub-Saharan African countries. Beyond the difference between the samples used
in the studies, the economic stakes of the choice of ERR are not necessarily the
same according to the region and the economy. Indeed, major changes have been
observed in the choices of ERR in Latin American countries since the end of the
Bretton Woods system, with a more pronounced tendency towards flexible or inter-
mediate arrangements since the beginning of the 1990s. This implies a movement
toward domestic ERR more consistent with the new international monetary regime
that is based on the flotation of the main global currencies (Carrera and Vuletin,
2013).
When they are significantly different from zero at the standard levels, the coefficients
associated with the control variables have the expected signs. Indeed, financial de-
velopment contributes to limiting the size of misalignments, whatever the specifica-
tion. This result is in line with Devereux and Lane (2003), who show that domestic
financial development helps stabilize the exchange rate in developing countries by
facilitating intertemporal smoothing by households and firms. Dubas (2009) also
highlights a significant contribution of financial development in reducing the size
of currency misalignments. Moreover, as expected, the years of banking crises are
associated with large significant misalignments. Finally, despite some heterogeneity
across the specifications, countries with stronger political institutions (more demo-
cratic economies) generally tend to limit the size of currency misalignments.
17See Appendix B for a detailed presentation of the monetary and budgetary discipline hypothe-
ses.
18It is worth mentioning that our article differs from Dubas (2009) in that it uses de facto rather
than de jure ERR classifications to test the impact of the ERR on real exchange rate misalignments.
Indeed, de facto codings seem to reflect countries’ behavior more accurately and, thus, are more
appropriate for assessing the effective impact of exchange rate policy on economic variables.
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Table 1: Explaining the absolute value of misalignments
Overall effect of the ERR Specific effect of the ERR
SHA classification IRR classification IRR classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ERR 0.045*** 0.078*** 0.040** 0.054** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Intermediate ERR 0.017 0.033** -0.003 0.010
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Flexible ERR 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.144*** 0.147***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Financial Dev. -0.278*** -0.245*** -0.199*** -0.160*** -0.232*** -0.196***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.048)
Crisis 0.114*** 0.107** 0.086** 0.086** 0.087** 0.084**
(0.044) (0.046) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
Institutions -0.003** -0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
∆tot (abs.) 0.116 0.017 0.056 -0.052 0.025 -0.058
(0.077) (0.080) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
Constant 0.208*** 0.263*** 0.280*** 0.219*** 0.060*** 0.133** 0.129*** 0.075* 0.173*** 0.238*** 0.243*** 0.183***
(0.011) (0.068) (0.023) (0.035) (0.020) (0.057) (0.029) (0.042) (0.011) (0.057) (0.022) (0.040)
Observations 720 720 654 654 799 799 695 695 799 799 695 695
R-squared 0.010 0.106 0.091 0.154 0.088 0.161 0.135 0.192 0.111 0.173 0.161 0.209
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of currency misalignments. Values in parentheses are robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
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3.3 Persistence of currency misalignments and ERR
Let us now assess the impact of ERR on the persistence of currency misalignments.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 2, and deserve several comments.
First, currency misalignments are characterized by a relatively high level of persis-
tence. Indeed, the lagged misalignment coefficient is highly significant, amounting
to 0.663 with the SHA classification (column (1)) and to 0.661 with the IRR clas-
sification (column (6)). Consistent with the cointegration hypothesis which implies
that misalignments follow a stationary process, these coefficients are significantly
less than one. The coefficient (β2) associated with the ERR variable is negative and
highly significant with an estimated value equal to -0.136 (-0.084 resp.) in column
(1) ((6) resp.). It is worth mentioning that since currency misalignments are not
considered in absolute terms in these regressions, the negative signs associated with
the ERR cannot be interpreted as a decrease in the size of misalignments thanks to
the flexibility of the regime. On the contrary, these negative and significant coeffi-
cients, regardless of the classification, probably indicate a tendency for flexible ERR
to generate more undervaluations.
Second, the sign of the coefficient associated with the interaction term gives an
indication of the impact of the ERR on the persistence of misalignments. Since a
higher value of ERR indicates greater flexibility and given that the misalignments are
positively and significantly related to their past values, the negative sign associated
with the interaction term means that the flexibility of ERR contributes to reducing
the persistence of currency misalignments. This result is robust to the classification
since the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5%
level under the IRR classification, and significant at the 1% level under the SHA
classification. Columns (5) and (10) report our privileged specifications, as they
include both country fixed effects and time dummies. From their estimation, we
can derive the degree of persistence of misalignments in each ERR, given by β̂1 +
β̂3 × ERR. Considering the SHA classification (in which ERR = 0 if peg and 1
otherwise), the level of persistence in misalignments is 0.848 when the countries
are under a fixed ERR and 0.620 when they are not. When we rely on the IRR
classification (column (10)), the degree of persistence of currency misalignments is
estimated at 0.894 under fixed regimes, 0.739 under intermediate regimes, and 0.584
under floating ERR. Our findings are robust to the retained specification since they
remain valid whether country and/or time fixed effects are present or not. Turning
to the control variables, they become non-significant—with the exception of the
terms of trade—when the lagged values of misalignments are included among the
regressors.
Overall, our results show that misalignments are strongly persistent in Latin Amer-
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ican countries. They indicate that more flexibility of ERR reduces this persistence,
and thus favors a faster adjustment of currency imbalances. These findings are con-
sistent with Friedman’s thesis on the ability of exchange rate flexibility to absorb
the economic disequilibria induced by external shocks faster. Although the empirical
robustness of this thesis has been questioned by some authors (Berka, Devereux, and
Engel, 2012; Chinn and Wei, 2013), it finds a favorable echo in several other studies
such as Edwards (2004), Gnimassoun and Mignon (2015), Gervais, Schembri, and
Suchanek (2016), Martin (2016), and Ghosh, Qureshi, and Tsangarides (2018).
Finally, the analysis of the impact of the ERR on both the size and persistence
of currency misalignments does not allow us to conclude in favor of a privileged
ERR. The main conclusion is that there is no panacea for exchange rate policy.
Fixed ERR have the advantage of limiting the size of currency imbalances, but they
are associated with higher persistence of misalignments. On the contrary, although
flexible ERR allow faster absorption of currency imbalances, they are likely to induce
larger disequilibria. The choice of ERR is a matter of arbitration. At all events,
when a country chooses a fixed ERR, its main challenge is to control its currency
misalignments to avoid a significant adjustment cost.
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Table 2: Explaining the persistence of misalignments
SHA classification IRR classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged Misalignments (misi,t−1) 0.663*** 0.876*** 0.869*** 0.870*** 0.848*** 0.661*** 1.094*** 1.049*** 1.082*** 1.049***
(0.058) (0.079) (0.089) (0.079) (0.088) (0.056) (0.105) (0.114) (0.108) (0.120)
ERRi,t -0.136*** -0.047*** -0.075*** -0.067*** -0.112*** -0.084*** -0.045*** -0.080*** -0.044*** -0.075***
(0.034) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020)
Interaction (misi,t−1 × ERRi,t) -0.236** -0.242** -0.236** -0.228** -0.165*** -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.155***
(0.101) (0.112) (0.101) (0.110) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.058)
Financial dev. -0.089 0.009 0.082 -0.063 -0.055 -0.084 -0.018 0.014 -0.065 -0.072
(0.123) (0.052) (0.121) (0.049) (0.122) (0.121) (0.047) (0.110) (0.046) (0.118)
Crisis -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007
(0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
Institutions -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Terms of trade 0.100** 0.038 0.094** 0.025 0.085* 0.139*** 0.058* 0.136*** 0.055* 0.129***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.031) (0.044) (0.030) (0.045)
Constant -0.086 -0.020 -0.084 -0.050 -0.126 0.024 0.036 0.021 0.007 -0.015
(0.089) (0.045) (0.078) (0.069) (0.089) (0.081) (0.041) (0.072) (0.052) (0.080)
Observations 654 654 654 654 654 695 695 695 695 695
R-squared 0.562 0.527 0.534 0.560 0.568 0.562 0.538 0.549 0.564 0.573
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the estimated value of currency misalignments. Values in parentheses are robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
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4 Robustness checks
For the sake of completeness, we check the sensitivity of our previous results to the
ERR classification, and perform additional robustness tests.
4.1 On the ERR classification
In addition to the IRR and SHA classifications, we construct a de facto ERR classi-
fication based on the methodology proposed by Coudert and Dubert (2005) (hence-
forth CD). Although less widely known and used in the literature, Coudert and
Dubert (2005)’s method appears to be very precise and well-articulated in the clas-
sification criteria. In the Appendix C, we detail the methodology and explain the
construction of ERR. Roughly speaking, three steps are involved: (i) detect the pres-
ence of a trend in the nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, (ii) compare the
volatility of the nominal exchange rate to the volatility for declared floating coun-
tries (namely Japan, Great Britain, and Germany, or the Eurozone after 1999 for
the latter), and (iii) compare the volatility of international reserves to the volatility
for the same bundle of major economies. Based on these three criteria, four types of
ERR are distinguished: peg, crawling peg, managed float, pure float. Accordingly,
this classification scheme takes four possible values: 1 for peg, 2 for crawling peg, 3
for managed float, and 4 for pure float. This measure covers our 17 countries from
1970 to 2016. During the 1970s, 59 percent of the countries in our sample adopted
a pegged regime. This percentage decreased to 32 percent for the period 2010-2016.
Thus, the percentage of fixed ERR has declined over time according to the CD clas-
sification, as shown in Figure A-1 in the Appendix C. This decreasing pattern is
consistent with what we observe when using the SHA and IRR classifications (see
Figure 1).
To complement the robustness analysis of our results to the ERR classification,
we define a “consensual” peg regime. Like Shambaugh (2004), we consider a binary
ERR: peg versus non-peg. The consensus relates to the pegged regime and is reached
when, for a given country, the three previous classification schemes (IRR, SHA and
CD) are unanimous in indicating a pegged regime in the same year. Note that, as
with the recoded classification scheme of Shambaugh, the consensual classification
takes the value 0 for the peg scheme, and 1 otherwise. This keeps consistency in
the definition of the different classification schemes, from the most rigid to the most
flexible, starting from the lowest to the highest value. The correlation coefficient
between the consensus classification (henceforth CONS) and the SHA classification
is 0.69 for the whole panel, and varies from 0.42 to 1 depending on the country.
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Table 3 is a reproduction of Table 1 with the only difference being that here we use
our new classification as well as the consensus classification as variables of interest
in the regressions aimed at explaining the size of currency misalignments. The
results are consistent and almost identical to our previous findings. As shown,
the magnitude of currency misalignments increases with the flexibility of the ERR.
These results are significant at conventional levels, with both the CD and CONS
classifications, regardless of the specification (with or without time fixed effects).
The disaggregated effects of ERR point in the same direction. Indeed, compared to
the pegged regime (taken as a benchmark) in the CD classification, the managed
floating and pure floating regimes are associated with more substantial currency
misalignments. However, the size of currency misalignments under the crawling peg
regime does not significantly differ from that under the peg regime. The estimated
coefficients of the control variables are also consistent with those of Table 1.
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions related to the effect of the ERR on the
persistence of misalignments using the new classification schemes (CD and CONS).
The previous findings reported in Table 2 are confirmed and even reinforced. In-
deed, the coefficient of the interaction term remains negative and significant at the
1% level, whatever the classification scheme and the specification (with or without
country fixed effects, and with or without time fixed effects). In other words, flexible
ERR are more effective in reducing the persistence of currency imbalances, and thus
promote a faster adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium exchange rate.
Overall, our results are robust to the ERR classification. They indicate that while
flexible ERR are associated with larger currency misalignments, they are the most
effective in absorbing them. Likewise, although fixed ERR are associated with less
sizeable currency misalignments, they maintain greater persistence. Exchange rate
policy in Latin American countries is, therefore, a trade-off issue. The choice of
a fixed ERR preserves them from large misalignments, but it is associated with a
higher adjustment cost in the event of shocks. When a country chooses a flexible
ERR, it faces larger currency misalignments, with potentially disastrous economic
consequences, but it can correct them more quickly. This is feasible because the room
for maneuver is greater under flexible exchange rates to cope with economic shocks,
in particular, external shocks. Changes in the nominal exchange rate affect relative
prices and thus contribute to changes in the real exchange rate. Such adjustments
are possible in fixed ERR only if the currency pegging rules change (devaluation or
revaluation). Since countries are keen to preserve the rules for as long as possible,
the currency misalignments that emerge are more persistent.
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Table 3: Sensitivity of the absolute value of misalignments to the choice of the classification
Overall effect of the ERR Specific effect of the ERR
CD classification CONS classification CD classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ERR 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.042** 0.053**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Crawling Peg 0.001 0.013 -0.010 -0.006
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Managed floating 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.085*** 0.087***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Pure floating 0.069*** 0.109*** 0.066*** 0.095***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
Financial dev. -0.251*** -0.209*** -0.267*** -0.239*** -0.258*** -0.221***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.051) (0.054) (0.045) (0.047)
Crisis 0.099*** 0.088** 0.119*** 0.113** 0.090** 0.083**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041)
Institutions -0.003** -0.001 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003* -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
∆tot(abs.) 0.059 -0.045 0.102 0.006 0.041 -0.051
(0.067) (0.070) (0.074) (0.080) (0.067) (0.070)
Constant 0.163*** 0.185*** 0.232*** 0.141*** 0.182*** 0.221*** 0.268*** 0.189*** 0.199*** 0.230*** 0.273*** 0.190***
(0.015) (0.071) (0.024) (0.042) (0.013) (0.066) (0.027) (0.040) (0.011) (0.069) (0.021) (0.039)
Observations 799 799 695 695 720 720 654 654 799 799 695 695
R-squared 0.025 0.121 0.092 0.163 0.017 0.105 0.090 0.152 0.036 0.125 0.104 0.171
Country FE No No No No No No No No No No No No
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of currency misalignments. Values in parentheses are robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
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Table 4: Sensitivity of the persistence of misalignments to the choice of the classification
CD classification CONS classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lagged Misalignments (misi,t−1) 0.663*** 0.990*** 0.975*** 1.010*** 0.996*** 0.680*** 0.981*** 0.990*** 0.958*** 0.964***
(0.055) (0.073) (0.086) (0.074) (0.085) (0.057) (0.065) (0.087) (0.067) (0.086)
ERRi,t -0.060*** -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.055*** -0.090*** -0.024* -0.056*** -0.026* -0.058**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022)
Interaction (misi,t−1 × ERRi,t) -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.322*** -0.345*** -0.297*** -0.315***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.085) (0.107) (0.087) (0.105)
Financial dev. -0.084 -0.015 0.036 -0.077* -0.086 -0.030 0.009 0.067 -0.032 -0.007
(0.120) (0.049) (0.110) (0.046) (0.117) (0.124) (0.056) (0.117) (0.053) (0.122)
Crisis 0.000 -0.010 -0.012 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010 -0.018 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052)
Institutions -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Terms of trade 0.100** 0.025 0.094** 0.017 0.082* 0.117** 0.064* 0.123** 0.057 0.114**
(0.044) (0.030) (0.043) (0.029) (0.043) (0.048) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.048)
Constant 0.033 0.054 -0.003 0.058 0.003 -0.066 -0.050 -0.116 -0.069 -0.133
(0.086) (0.038) (0.079) (0.048) (0.082) (0.086) (0.048) (0.084) (0.062) (0.090)
Observations 695 695 695 695 695 654 654 654 654 654
R-squared 0.569 0.543 0.551 0.574 0.582 0.551 0.525 0.531 0.553 0.558
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the estimated value of currency misalignments. Values in parentheses are robust
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
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4.2 Additional robustness tests
First, we assess the effect of the ERR on the size of misalignments through the prism
of regional differences in terms of exchange rate policy. This exercise is not only
interesting in its own right but also serves as a robustness test. Indeed, when we
focus on the Central American countries, we notice that the frequency of managed
or pure floating regimes represents between 12 and 26% of the total depending on
the classification, against 30 to 39% for the whole panel. In other words, the Cen-
tral American countries remained for the most part under a peg (50%) or crawling
peg (23%) regime over the period under study. Therefore, given the above results,
we can expect the size of misalignments to be smaller in this region than in the
South American area. To test this hypothesis, we first construct a Central Amer-
ica dummy variable that takes the value of one for the following countries: Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and
Trinidad and Tobago, and zero for the other countries. Then, we replace in regres-
sion (3) the EER variable with the Central America dummy. Table 5 presents the
results. As shown, in each specification, the Central America dummy variable has
an associated significantly negative coefficient. These results confirm further that
the level of misalignments depends heavily on a country’s ERR.
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Table 5: The regional effect of the exchange rate regime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Central American dummy -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.124***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)








Constant 0.287*** 0.317*** 0.346*** 0.283***
(0.012) (0.063) (0.021) (0.036)
Observations 799 799 695 695
R-squared 0.074 0.155 0.140 0.208
Country FE No No No No
Time FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of
currency misalignments. The dummy variable of Central America takes the value 1 when the country
belongs to Central America and 0 otherwise. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
Second, instead of the absolute value of misalignments, we consider squared mis-
alignments as a measure of size. This is obviously a way to exaggerate the size
of misalignments, and to examine whether the ERR has an impact on increasingly
large currency distortions. As shown in Table 6, flexible ERR are associated with
increasingly extreme misalignments regardless of classification—the effect being less
significant (10%) with the SHA and CONS classifications. It is also worth mention-
ing that financial development appears to be an absorber of extreme misalignments.
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Table 6: Squared misalignments
SHA classification IRR classification CD classification CONS classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERR 0.029* 0.034* 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.029* 0.034*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019)
Financial dev. -0.203*** -0.167*** -0.135*** -0.091** -0.182*** -0.132*** -0.203*** -0.167***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) (0.051)
Crisis 0.139** 0.128** 0.102** 0.100* 0.114** 0.101** 0.139** 0.128**
(0.057) (0.058) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.057) (0.058)
Institution -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
∆tot (abs.) 0.041 -0.048 0.012 -0.076 0.014 -0.070 0.041 -0.048
(0.060) (0.070) (0.050) (0.060) (0.052) (0.061) (0.060) (0.070)
Constant 0.129*** 0.058** -0.000 -0.047 0.093*** 0.008 0.129*** 0.058**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
Observations 654 654 695 695 695 695 654 654
R-squared 0.063 0.138 0.098 0.164 0.065 0.145 0.063 0.138
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the squared misalignment. Values
in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level,
respectively. FE: fixed effects.
Finally, turning to methodological issues and as an ultimate robustness test, instead
of using the DOLS estimator, we rely on the Dynamic Common-Correlated Effects
(DCCE) estimator developed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015). This estimator is spe-
cially designed to account for cross-section dependence, and is therefore particularly
relevant in our case. We compute a new series of currency misalignments using this
estimator, and subsequently estimate all the previously considered regressions on
the size and persistence of misalignments with all the classifications. We obtain the
same results, and our main conclusions remain unchanged.19
5 Conclusion
This paper aims at assessing the impact of ERR on currency misalignments in Latin
American countries. We investigate whether the choice of ERR affects both the size
and the persistence of exchange rate imbalances.
Relying on a panel of 17 Latin American countries over the 1970-2016 period, we
19To save space, we do not report the results, but they are available upon request from the
authors.
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show that greater flexibility in the ERR is associated with larger currency mis-
alignments compared to a fixed regime. Complementarily, our findings show that,
whereas misalignments are found to be persistent, such inertia is lower under flex-
ible regimes. In other words, floating ERR permit a faster correction of currency
imbalances in line with Friedman’s hypothesis. Thanks to flexibility, changes in the
nominal exchange rate have an impact on relative prices and, thus, on the real ex-
change rate allowing countries under flexible ERR to react more quickly when they
face external shocks. Nevertheless, as a compensation to this limitation to adjust
shocks and correct misalignments, fixed ERR show more monetary and budgetary
disciplines which as we find that fixed ERR tend to reduce inflation and deficits.
On the whole, our paper shows that Latin American countries face a key trade-off
in their choice of ERR: they have to arbitrate between sizeable but less persistent
misalignments on the one hand, and long-lasting but lower currency imbalances on
the other hand. Given their history, Latin American countries should pay particular
attention to their exchange rate policies, and have to adopt policies that govern
the behavior of the real exchange rate. Indeed, as discussed in Frenkel and Rapetti
(2010) and Martin Guzman and Stiglitz (2018), preserving a stable and competitive
real exchange rate appears to be the necessary condition to sustain economic growth
in the region. Exchange rate policy has a key role to play in achieving this goal.
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A Descriptive statistics, cross-sectional indepen-
dence, unit root and cointegration tests results
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Relative productivity (BS measure) 799 112.285 25.541 56.298 198.255
Real effective exchange rate (REER) 799 114.780 49.779 9.692 558.756
Trade openness (X+M, %GDP) 799 59.146 31.534 10.337 165.344
Government expenditures (%GDP) 799 12.417 3.556 3.219 22.734
Net foreign assets (%GDP) 799 -44.521 36.541 -220.102 11.655
Exchange rate misalignment 799 -0.000 0.317 -1.717 1.152
Exchange rate misalignment (absolute value) 799 0.231 0.217 0.000 1.717
under fixed regime (IRR) 221 0.173 0.159 0.001 1.018
under intermediate regime (IRR) 333 0.190 0.153 0.000 0.764
under flexible regime (IRR) 245 0.339 0.288 0.005 1.717
under pegged regime (SHA) 270 0.208 0.182 0.001 1.152
under non pegged regime (SHA) 450 0.253 0.242 0.000 1.717
Financial development 797 0.281 0.172 0.026 1.086
Crisis 714 0.104 0.305 0.000 1.000
Quality of institutions 799 4.995 5.937 -9.000 10.000
Terms of trade (tot) 799 94.679 26.426 23.212 220.593
∆tot (abs.) 782 0.080 0.098 0.000 1.078
GDP pc growth 799 1.824 3.966 -15.219 16.129
Election year 799 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000
Table A-2: Testing weak (no) cross-sectional dependence
Variables Test name Test statistics P-value
reer Pesaran WCD test 79.523 0.000
bs Pesaran WCD test 79.852 0.000
gov Pesaran WCD test 77.106 0.000
open Pesaran WCD test 77.231 0.000
nfa Pesaran WCD test 64.222 0.000
tot Pesaran WCD test 79.746 0.000
υ̂ Pesaran WCD test 6.311 0.000
υ̂ Breusch-Pagan LM test of CSI 803.150 0.000
Notes: The Pesaran test is performed on the raw variables and the residuals, whereas the Breusch
and Pagan test is only a post-estimation test. WCD stands for the null hypothesis of “weak
cross-sectional dependence”, and CSI for the null hypothesis of “cross-sectional independence”.
υ̂ are the estimated residuals from regression (7).
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Table A-3: Results of Pesaran (2007)’s unit root tests
CADF t-stat P-value Critical values
10% 5% 1%
reer -1.658 0.999 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
bs -2.540 0.175 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
gov -2.286 0.599 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
open -1.847 0.990 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
tot -2.872 0.006 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
nfa -2.111 0.859 -2.630 -2.710 -2.850
Table A-4: Results of Westerlund (2007)’s cointegration tests
Statistic Value Z-value Robust P-value
Gτ -3.036 -0.781 0.055
Gα -12.979 2.092 0.017
Pτ -11.146 -0.313 0.169
Pα -10.543 1.602 0.161
Notes: The width of the Bartlett kernel window used in the semi-
parametric estimation of long-run variances is defined according
to the number 4(T/100)2/9 ≈ 3. The number of bootstrap repli-
cations is 1000. One lag and one lead have been considered.
Table A-5: Estimation results of the cointegrating relationship
Number of lags/leads (p)





















Country FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Heterogeneous trends Yes Yes
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% confidence level, respectively. Values in parentheses
are robust standard errors. FE: fixed effects.
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B Monetary and budgetary disciplines
Our approach to assess whether the monetary and budgetary discipline hypotheses
hold consists in testing the impact of the ERR on inflation and fiscal balance.20 To
this end, we rely on the following specifications:





i,t + εi,t, (9a)





i,t + υi,t, (9b)
where πi,t is the inflation rate in country i at time year t, and fiscali,t is general gov-
ernment net lending/borrowing over GDP in country i at time year t. The control
variables included in Xi,t are the GDP per capita growth rate and the log of terms
of trade. In the budgetary regression (9b), we also control for the electoral cycle
by adding a dummy variable indicating if, in a specific year, presidential or parlia-
mentary elections have taken place. The sources and data construction of variables
involved in Equations (9a) and (9b) are the following. The inflation rate πi,t (based
on consumer prices) and the GDP per capita growth rate come from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. General government net lending/borrowing,
expressed as a percent of GDP (fiscali,t), is taken from the IMF International Fi-
nancial Statistics database. The terms of trade, totit, are defined as the ratio of the
country’s export price index to its import price index (source: CEPAL). Finally, the
elections dummy variable takes the value 1 in years in which presidential or par-
liamentary elections have taken place, 0 otherwise (source: International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Note that the fiscal variable covers all
countries in our sample but is spotty before 1990, significantly reducing the number
of observations. The estimation of Equations (9a) and (9b) is performed using OLS.
Table A-6 reports the estimated effect of the ERR on inflation (Equation (9a)), the
regressions being performed with and without country and time fixed effects.21 Our
primary interest is in the value of θ̂1 which measures the effect of ERR on inflation.
The estimates θ̂1 remain highly significant across all the specifications. When using
the SHA classification, they vary from a low of 0.042 (column (2)) to a high of 0.162
(column (3)). Moreover, the results, reported in columns (5) to (8), show that our
20Monetary and fiscal disciplines here refer to the control (reduction) of inflation and the fiscal
deficit, respectively. We do not elaborate further on this analysis which is beyond the scope of this
paper.
21When estimating Equation (9a), we remove observations characterized by πi,t > 100% to
ensure that the results are not driven by spurious country/year observations.
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estimates of θ̂1 are also positive with the use of the IRR classification. In particular,
the estimated coefficient remains highly significant and almost insensitive to the
econometric specification in all four cases. Note also that the coefficients associated
with the two control variables have the expected signs (although the estimates for
the coefficient associated with terms of trade are less precise). By and large, our
results reveal that fixed ERR tend to generate significantly less inflation. This in
turn supports the monetary discipline hypothesis.
Table A-6: Test of the hypothesis of monetary discipline (Equation (9a))
SHA classification IRR classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERR 0.098*** 0.042*** 0.162*** 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.091*** 0.096***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
GDP pc growth -0.004** -0.005** -0.002 -0.003 -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Terms of trade 0.076** 0.090** 0.052 0.051 0.012 0.045 -0.011 0.012
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030)
Constant 0.025 0.034 -0.004 0.006 -0.008 -0.075 -0.051 -0.115**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049)
Observations 628 628 628 628 705 705 705 705
R-squared 0.086 0.220 0.404 0.491 0.132 0.263 0.397 0.518
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the inflation rate. Values in
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
Table A-7 shows the results when investigating the budgetary discipline hypothesis.
The baseline specifications (columns (4) and (8)) control for country and time fixed
effects. In both cases, the estimated coefficient δ1 is highly significant and ranges
from -1.005 (SHA) to -0.942 (IRR). These estimates suggest that a permanent tran-
sition to a more flexible ERR regime (from a peg to a non-peg regime in SHA, for
instance) is associated with a reduction of the fiscal stance of 1% of GDP. This
is a sizable effect. However, as columns (2), (5) and (7) reveal, this effect is not
always statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. The regressions in
Table A-7 also control for GDP per capita growth, terms of trade and elections.
As expected, positive shocks to GDP per capita growth are favorable for the fiscal
balance, while the coefficient for terms of trade is insignificant. Interestingly, the
coefficient associated with the election dummy variable is negative and significant
in regressions that control for country fixed effects (columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)),
whereas this is not the case in otherwise identical regressions that do not account for
such effects (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)). Given the difficulty of controlling for all
32
CEPII Working Paper Currency misalignments and exchange rate regimes
the country-specific determinants of fiscal balance, there are good reasons to distrust
estimates from panel regressions that do not include country fixed effects. That is
why panel regressions with fixed effects are our preferred specifications when investi-
gating the budgetary discipline hypothesis. Although our findings for the budgetary
discipline are less clear-cut than our results on the monetary discipline hypothe-
sis, our preferred specifications in which country and time fixed effects are present
(columns (4) and (8)) suggest that fixed ERR tend to weaken deficits. Overall, the
budgetary discipline hypothesis is thus corroborated.
Table A-7: Test of the hypothesis of budgetary discipline (Equation (9b))
SHA classification IRR classification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERR -0.564* -0.640 -0.539* -1.005** -0.050 -1.179*** 0.157 -0.942***
(0.333) (0.412) (0.316) (0.395) (0.226) (0.372) (0.184) (0.316)
GDP pc growth 0.409*** 0.388*** 0.363*** 0.324*** 0.447*** 0.407*** 0.406*** 0.349***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Terms of trade -1.694 -0.824 -0.772 1.941* -1.469 -0.546 -0.527 1.459
(1.131) (1.544) (0.890) (1.159) (1.046) (1.238) (0.831) (1.037)
Election year -0.489 -0.474* -0.444 -0.482** -0.442 -0.428* -0.464 -0.459*
(0.312) (0.242) (0.317) (0.235) (0.295) (0.233) (0.292) (0.234)
Constant -0.441 -0.940 1.693 -4.895*** -1.180 0.143 0.746 -3.399***
(1.069) (1.435) (1.051) (1.349) (1.167) (1.460) (1.130) (1.269)
Observations 385 385 385 385 439 439 439 439
R-squared 0.202 0.468 0.319 0.611 0.211 0.478 0.340 0.606
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: The OLS estimator is used in these regressions. The dependent variable is the fiscal balance (% of GDP).
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
confidence level, respectively. FE: fixed effects.
C Classification of Coudert and Dubert (2005)
The procedure to obtain the de facto exchange rate regime classification of Coudert
and Dubert (2005) involves three steps, which are detailed below.
1. Assessing annual trend in the exchange rate. In the first step, the annual
trend is extracted by estimating, for each country and each year of our sample,
the following regression:
lnEt = α + γ × t+ εt, (10)
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where lnEt is the logarithm of the monthly nominal exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar, t is a linear trend, and εt denotes the residual term (t = 1, . . . , 12).
Data on nominal exchange rates Et are monthly and are extracted from the
IMF International Financial Statistics database. The annual trend for year j,
denoted by β̂j, is obtained from the OLS estimate of γ as β̂j = (1 + γ̂)
12 − 1.
If β̂j > 0, the series of monthly exchange rates are detrended (Ẽt denoted the
detrended exchange rate in what follows). If the annual trend is negative, its
absolute value |β̂j| is compared to an arbitrary threshold τ . Following Coudert
and Dubert (2005), τ is set to 2% annually.
2. Comparing exchange rate variances. The second step consists in com-
paring the annual variance of changes in ∆Et (alternatively ∆Ẽt if β̂j > 0 in
step 1) to the average variance of a benchmark set of floating currencies. The
benchmark sample of floating currencies is made up of the Japanese Yen, the
British Pound, and the German Deutsche Mark (after 1999, the Euro stands in
for the Deutsche Mark). By considering a floating currencies benchmark, we
are able to compute Fisher tests applied to the variance of nominal exchange
rates. Let s2i denote the empirical annual variance of ∆Et for the Latin Amer-
ican country i, and s2b the average of annual variances of the benchmark. By
assuming that annual variances follow normal distributions with theoretical
variance σ2i (σ
2
b resp.) for country i (the benchmark group resp.), this implies






i ) follows a Fisher distribution F (nb, ni) where nb




i being calculated with 36 and 12
observations respectively, we get nb = 35 and ni = 11. The null hypothesis H0
is that, for a given year, the variance of exchange rate changes in country i is









the exchange rate variance of country i is considered as low (2.54 being the
5% critical value of a F (35, 11)). Conversely, if s2i ≥ (1/2.54)s2b , the variance
of country i is treated as high.22
3. Comparing changes in international reserves variances. In the final
stage, we apply the same test presented in step 2 to the variance of changes
in official reserves (∆Rt). Data on international reserves Rt are monthly and
are extracted from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. Ac-
cordingly, the empirical variance of changes in foreign reserves for country i,
22During the years 1970-1972, currencies of the benchmark were part of the Bretton Woods
system which was characterized by fixed parities against the U.S. dollar and low volatility in
nominal exchange rates. Since step 2 is an equality test of exchange rate variance between country
i and the benchmark group, the methodology tends to be biased in favor of flexible regimes.
Therefore, some spurious observations for years 1970, 1971 and 1972 primarily classified as pure
or managed float were converted into a fixed regime to account for the low exchange rate volatility
in the benchmark sample.
34
CEPII Working Paper Currency misalignments and exchange rate regimes
denoted by s̃2i with a theoretical value σ̃
2
i , is compared to the average variance
of changes in foreign reserves of the benchmark group (noted s̃2b with a cor-
responding theoretical value σ̃2b ). Assuming that monthly rates of changes in
reserves follow normal distributions, a Fisher test can be computed. In this
case, the null hypothesis is that, for a given year, the variance of the reserves















b ) follows a Fisher
distribution F (35, 11). If s̃2i > 2.54s̃
2
b , the variance of international reserves
is considered as high. Otherwise, if s̃2i ≤ 2.54s̃2b , the variance of international
reserves is considered as low.
The classification of Coudert and Dubert (2005), derived from the procedure de-
scribed above, can be summarized by Table A-8. The corresponding measure of
ERR, presented in the last column, is coded as follows: 4 = peg, 3 = crawling peg,
2 = managed float and 1 = pure float.
Table A-8: Exchange Rate Regimes in Coudert and Dubert (2005)’s classification
Annual Trend Exchange rate variance Reserves variance Regime Dummy
(step 1) (step 2) (step 3) variable
β̂ > 0 and β̂ < τ low peg 4
β̂ < 0 and |β| < τ low peg 4
β̂ > 0 and β̂ > τ low crawling peg 3
β̂ > 0 high high managed float 2
β̂ < 0 and |β| > τ high managed float 2
β̂ < 0 and |β| < τ high high managed float 2
β̂ > 0 high low pure float 1
β̂ < 0 and |β| > τ low pure float 1
β̂ < 0 and |β| < τ high low pure float 1
The measure of ERR is available for the 17 countries in our sample and covers the
1970-2016 period. Figure A-1 plots the decade average of the share of fixed ex-
change rate regimes for the Latin American continent, and separately for each of
the regions, i.e., Central America and South America.23 The overall pattern is very
similar to that of Figure 1. First, in all decades, the share of fixed ERR is higher in
Central American countries than in South America. Second, for the whole sample,
the percentage of fixed exchange rate regimes declined over time from 58% in the
23Consistent with Figure 1 which plots the share of fixed exchange rate regimes in the SHA and
IRR classifications for a sample of 16 countries (Ecuador is dropped) over the 1970-2014 period,
we use in Figure A-1 the same sample such that the results are comparable across classifications.
35
CEPII Working Paper Currency misalignments and exchange rate regimes
1970s to 30% in the 2010 decade according to the CD classification. However, there
are important differences across the two geographical areas. In Central America, the
share of fixed EER also significantly decreased (81% during the 70’s to 45% over the
2010-2014 period). After a sharp decline during the 1970s, this share has remained
stable in South America since the 1980s and amounts to 10-15%.
Figure A-1: Percentage of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin American Coun-
tries (Coudert and Dubert’s classification).












Note: The group of 16 Latin American countries comprises 8 South American countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) and 8 Central
American countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago). Period: 1970-2014.
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